In May 2021, a single compromised VPN credential shut down 5,500 miles of the Colonial Pipeline. The credential had no MFA. The VPN had no session logging. The access had no time limit. DarkSide ransomware entered through that one unprotected remote access point.
TSA issued its first security directive within weeks. Every TSA cybersecurity requirement since traces back to that access control failure: pipeline directives, rail directives, and the March 2023 Emergency Amendment for aviation. The technical requirements across all three are identical because the root cause is identical. One unprotected credential.
The same unprotected remote access credential that shut down Colonial is the same credential your baggage handling vendor uses to connect to airport PLCs. Remote access ranks among the top three OT vulnerability vectors per the SANS 2025 survey. For aviation ground OT: baggage handling PLCs running Modbus, perimeter intrusion detection, airfield ground lighting controllers, fueling system SCADA, and building automation in secure terminal areas.
This is not a theoretical risk. It is the exact attack path that triggered every TSA cybersecurity directive in existence.